Introduction
Over the past 1 5 years, as ecologists and environmentally oriented social scientists have begun to develop "sustainability science" (Kates et al. 2001 ), the idea of forest transition has gained currency as a useful way of summarizing the historical experience with forests as the societies undergo economic development. In brief, as societies experience urbanization and industrialization, forests first decline dramatically in extent. Then the trends in forest cover turn around, with increases in forest cover occurring gradually over time. Mather (1992) These analyses, while useful, leave three important questions unanswered: (1) How does forest loss influence an individual landowner's incentives to reforest? (2) How do ecological variables, like the extent of forest cover, the associated environmental services, and rates of forest regrowth affect the likelihood of a forest transition? (3) What happens to human societies and ecosystems after the forest transition occurs? Does the forest transition lead to a society that successfully manages regenerated forests or are episodes of largescale deforestation likely to occur again after forests spread?
The purpose of this paper is to develop a minimum model of forest transition to give theoretically rigorous answers to these questions. Unlike the assumption of the EKC theory, our model assumes no explicit relation between the level of economic prosperity and the rate of deforestation! Rather it adopts a bottom-up approach; beginning with decision-making by individual landowners about deforestation (i.e., land conversion from forest to agriculture), agricultural abandonment followed by forest regeneration are modeled in an integrated way. The emerging landscape patterns from the coupling of deforestation and forest regeneration processes are investigated and compared with forest transition patterns.
As an important factor of forest transition, we propose two feedback mechanisms between forest loss and forest value. To be specific, we examine two situations named the "forest scarcity hypothesis" and the "ecosystem service hypothesis." The forest scarcity hypothesis has a microeconomic foundation (Hyde 1980 ) and has recently been recast by Rudel (1998) and Rudel et al. (2005) . It states that as forest cover declines, forest products become scarcer and prices for them rise, encouraging people to afforest and protect existing forests. The enhanced reforestation caused by forest scarcity has been observed in many places such as West Africa (Fairhead and Leach 1995), India (Rush 1991) , and the Philippines (Walters 1997) .
In contrast, the ecosystem service hypothesis is derived from the evidence regarding eco-physiological changes caused by deforestation. The landscape degrades in many ways (Bierregaard et al. 1992 ). The community structure in forest ecosystems changes (Klein 1989 , Didham et al. 1996 , altering the microclimate through biogeochemical and hydrological processes (Kapos 1989 A minimum model of forest transition is developed here by incorporating these two hypotheses into a Markov chain model for land-use dynamics outlined by Satake and Iwasa (2006) . Given the model, we address the three questions outlined above, and explore the conditions necessary for inducing forest transitions. The analysis shows that the rate of future discounting by landowners and the rate of forest regrowth play a key role in determining the likelihood of a forest transition. We will see that two different feedback mechanisms result in qualitatively quite different consequences especially when forests regenerate rapidly.
The Model
Transition between forest, agricultural, and abandoned land Land-use dynamics on individual land parcels. -We assume that a society is composed of TV land parcels, each of which is managed by a landowner /, i 6 { 1 , . . . , N}. In this section, we first explain the land-use dynamics of a single parcel. Let 5/(0 be the state variable at the land parcel / in year /. We consider three land-use states: if parcel i is forested A if parcel / is agricultural ( 1 ) E if parcel / is abandoned.
Each land parcel shows Markovian transition between different states (Fig. 1) . A forested parcel (F) is converted to agricultural land (A) following the landowner's decision. The decision about land conversion is made with probability r(x, t) in year / when the extent of forest cover is jc, and is given as a function of the net gain of land conversion from F to A as explained later. We call r(x, t) the "deforestation rate."
Agricultural land changes to abandoned land with probability rj in a year. We call r\ the "abandonment rate." A small rj represents the situation where agricultural operation continues to produce profits for many years and the likelihood of abandonment is low. On the contrary, a large r| indicates that soil fertility and agricultural profits decline sharply with continued cultivation. Under these circumstances landowners abandon the land after only a few years when agricultural operations become unprofitable (Mather and Needle 1998). Satake and Iwasa (2006) developed a land-use model in which abandonment of agricultural land occurs due to the strategic decision-making of landowners, but here we assume a constant rate of abandonment for simplification.
Abandonment of agricultural land may result in growth of secondary vegetation. Such reforestation helps to sequester carbon, restore nutrient and water cycling, and leads to the development of a forest. We assume that an abandoned parcel will finally revert back into forested land (Fig. 1) . The rate of forest recovery is denoted by u(x), where x is the extent of forest cover. The forest regeneration in secondary succession is likely to be suppressed if a large area is cleared for agriculture because seed supply may be limited by the lack of seed sources, and the lack of seed dispersers (e.g., frugivorous birds or bats in tropics [Guevara et al. 1986 In the first stage of forest transition, the most common shift in land use is from a forested to an agricultural landscape (i.e., a decline of x and an increase of y). In the second stage, considerable amounts of forest regrowth occur after abandonment of agricultural lands, leading to a shift from an agricultural to an abandoned landscape (i.e., a decline of y and an increase of z), and finally a shift from an abandoned to forested land occurs (i.e., a decline of z and an increase of x).
Utilities: forest scarcity and ecosystem service hypotheses Landowners' propensity to deforest (i.e., r(x, /)) depends on how large a utility they expect to receive from deforestation. In this section, we first define the utility given to each land-use state.
Let Ui(t) be the utility received by landowner / in year /: b(x, t) indicates the forest value attributable to ecosystem services when the parcel is forested. x{t) is the extent of forest cover at the aggregate level in year t (see Eq. 3a) for its dynamical change); b(x, t) is interpreted as income from selling forest products such as fuel woods, or as a subsidy from government for sequestering carbon or providing recreational opportunities, and protecting watersheds (Turner et al. 2003 ); c in Eq. 4 is the utility of agriculture, which is the total revenue received (e.g., monetary benefits by crop sales) minus the cost incurred (e.g., cultivating, harvesting, and transporting costs) when a landowner is engaged in agriculture. The utility of an abandoned parcel is 0, lower than that of forested and agricultural land, because bare land does not produce any utilities. In order to depict the higher one-time return from deforestation than that from forest conservation, we consider that the one-time utility of a forested parcel does not exceed that of an agricultural parcel when the extent of forest cover is 1 [i.e., c > b(x) > Ofor jc=1].
Here we assume that the forest value is negatively or positively correlated with the extent of forest cover:
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the ecosystem service hypothesis (5) where b is the basic rate of forest value and a is a positive constant called the coefficient of forest value. The negative correlation between the forest value and the extent of forest cover (i.e., db/dx < 0) corresponds to the situation of the forest scarcity hypothesis, because the forest value rises as forest cover declines in extent. The reverse relationship, where the value of forests increases with their extent (i.e., db/dx > 0) represents the ecosystem service hypothesis, because it depicts the degradation of forest value as forest cover decreases in extent. Although these are very simple assumptions, we will see that these additions play a key role in determining the likelihood of forest transitions.
Decision making about deforestation
In this section, we explain how to determine the deforestation rate, r(x, t). Each landowner who manages a forested parcel makes a binary decision about whether or not to deforest (i.e., land conversion from forest to agriculture) each year. This decision is influenced by the net expected gain of deforestation, defined as the expected discounted utility received from deforestation minus that of forest lost through deforestation: where co is the discount factor that ranges from 0 to 1 ; f is the deforestation rate in the future (0 < f < 1) with which landowners anticipate the likelihood of future deforestation. The first part in the right-hand side in Eq. 8a, b, is the utility from forested land to be received in the present. The second part indicates the sum of two terms, the conditional expected discounted utility if the landowner keeps the parcel forested at the next time step [i.e., co(l -f)VF{t + 1, jc)] and that if the landowner converts the parcel from forest to agriculture [i.e., corTA(/ -I-1, x)]. The distant future utility would be less important in the decision than the utility expected in the near future. This time preference is expressed by the discount factor co, defined as 1/(1 + f) where f is the discount rate. When co is close to 1 , the rate of future discounting is low and the landowner perceives the future utility of the land to be as important as the current utility. In contrast, if co is close to 0, the landowner discount the future utility heavily and attaches more importance to the current utility.
In a similar manner, the expected discounted utilities of agriculture and abandoned land are given by VA(t,x) = c + <x>[(l-r\)VA(t+\,x) + r\VE{t+l,x)] We insert Eq. 9 into Eq. 7 to see how landowners decide whether or not to deforest their lands. If AV(x) > 0, landowners are more likely to deforest; otherwise the deforestation rate is slow. The deforestation rate in the present (r(x, t) in Eq. 7) and the deforestation rate in the future (r in Eq. 8a) can be different. A. Satake, Y. Iwasa, and S. A. Levin {unpublished manuscript) gave a detailed analysis on how different values of f results in different outcomes. They showed that if the degree of stochasticity is small (i.e., P is sufficiently large), f does not influence the outcomes in terms of decision making about deforestation and resultant landscape dynamics. In addition, by noting that all parameters, co, f, r\, and u, range from 0 to 1, we have K > 0 (Eq. 9). This means that the sign of AV(x) is independent of f. Hence we simply consider that f = 0 in the following analysis. We also assume that a society is homogeneous, with all landowners using the same discount factor (co).
Methods of equilibrium and stability analysis of landscape dynamics Forest transition theory explains a widely observed historical pattern of change in forest cover, first shrinking and then expanding in size, but the theory does not predict what happens after the transition. Does the forest transition lead to a society that successfully manages regenerated forests? Alternatively, does largescale forest clearing recur after forests become fully grown? These questions can be answered theoretically by analyzing the equilibrium and stability of landscape dynamics developed in Eqs. 3a and 3b.
From the assumption that the proportion of lands allocated to different uses does not change at equilibrium, the extent of forest cover at equilibrium (jc*) is determined by solving the following Eq. (see Eqs. 3a, 3b, and 7):
where AV(x) is given in Eq. 9 and x* is derived numerically from Eq. 10 because it cannot be solved analytically. Once jc* is determined, from Eqs. 3a and 3b, the fraction of agricultural land at equilibrium (y*) is calculated as y*=r*x*/n (11) where r* is the deforestation rate at equilibrium. The fraction of abandoned land at equilibrium (z*) is simply given by z* = 1 -x* -y*. The stability of equilibrium is analyzed by calculating the eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix of the landscape dynamics given by Eqs. 3a and 3b (see the Appendix for details). If the absolute values of both of two eigenvalues are less than 1, the equilibrium is stable. To assess the ability of the forest scarcity and ecosystem service hypotheses to predict forest transitions, we examine the performance of this model at different parameter values.
Results

Forest scarcity hypothesis
Landscape patterns at equilibrium. -When forest value increases with forest scarcity (i.e., the forest scarcity hypothesis), r(x)x (left-hand side in Eq. 10) is an increasing function of x but t|u(jc)(1 -jc)/[r| + u(jc)] (right-hand side in Eq. 10) is a convex function of x. Since the relations, r||i(jc)(l -x)/[r| + ji(jc)] > r(x)x for x = 0 and t|u(jc)(1 -jc)/[r| + u(jc)] < r(x)x for x = 1, hold, there is a single positive equilibrium.
From Eqs. 9 and 10, the extent of forest cover at equilibrium (x*) is shown to be close to 0 when the discount factor (co) is small (Fig. 2a) . In this case, the expected net gain of deforestation is positive regardless of the initial extent of forest cover [i.e., AV(x) > 0 for all x] because landowners only consider short-term returns from deforestation due to heavy discounting of the future utility. Thereby landowners are likely to deforest their land for agriculture, which first leads to a decline of forested lands, and then yields an increase of agricultural land (Fig. 2b, c) .
But agricultural lands are abandoned constantly, because of declines in agricultural profits, which causes a gradual increase of abandoned lands (Fig. 2b, c) . If the basic rate of forest recovery is smaller than the abandonment rate (i.e., p. < r\; a flux from abandoned to forested land is smaller than that from agricultural to abandoned land), a society eventually accumulates abandoned lands that produce no utility (Fig. 2b) . We call this the "abandoned landscape." In contrast, if p. > r|, the abandoned landscape is replaced by the landscape where a society is dominated by agricultural lands (Fig.  2c) , called the "agricultural landscape." This replacement happens because a fast regeneration of forest and biogeochemical/hydrological processes allows a repeated establishment of agricultural lands. In other words, cyclical processes, involving shifts from deforestation to agriculture to abandonment and then to forest recovery (Fig. 1) , develop smoothly if the basic rate of forest recovery is large. Neither abandoned nor agricultural landscapes experience a turnaround from deforestation to forest restoration.
As co increases, jc* gradually increases from 0 to 1 (Fig. 2a) . In the region where x* is sufficiently larger than 0, the expected net gain of deforestation is negative when x < x* but positive when jc > jc*. Therefore if the extent of forest cover in the present is larger than x*, landowners deforest their parcels, resulting in a largescale deforestation. But after the deforestation, the forest value rises due to forest scarcity mechanism, leading landowners to protect regenerated forests. Consequently the extent of forest cover gradually increases, and eventually a society establishes the forest of size jc* (Fig. 2d) . We call this the "forested landscape." As the forest value rises more rapidly due to forest scarcity (i.e., as a in Eq. 5 increases), the creation of this forested landscape becomes more likely (Fig. 3a) , implying that the forest scarcity mechanism contributes to the conservation of regenerated forests.
Instability of forested landscape caused by rapid forest regrowth. -In the preceding sections, we derived the equilibrium of landscape dynamics under the assumption of forest scarcity, but this equilibrium may be stable or unstable. In this section, the stability of the equilibrium will be analyzed. We illustrate the "bifurcation diagram" by plotting the long-term orbit of the extent of forest cover along with the change of basic rate of forest recovery (ji; Fig. 4 ; we set h in Eq. 2 to zero in order to clearly show that instability can be caused only by the forest scarcity mechanism).
When {i is small, the landscape converges to a stable forested landscape (Fig. 4) where almost the entire landscape is covered with forest. As ji increases, the (Fig. 4) . We illustrate the unstable forested landscape by plotting the time series of the fraction of forested, agricultural, and abandoned land (Fig. 5) . The cycle of forest decline (a solid thick line), agricultural expansion (a solid thin line), and then land abandonment (a dashed line) followed by forest recovery occurs episodically. As (i increases further, this unstable forested landscape is replaced by the stable agricultural landscape where only a small fraction of lands are covered with forest ( Fig. 4; also see Fig. 2c ).
The instability of forested landscape occurs according to the following mechanism. The forest value may be relatively low when the landscape is dominated by forest (Eq. 5). Under this circumstance, landowners may deforest their land to establish agriculture. Consequently, the forest cover decreases, and the value of forest rises, which effectively stops further deforestation. When cultivators abandon land and it slowly develops secondary forest (i.e., small £), the forest cover gradually increases, and a landscape eventually approaches to the stable forested landscape. But if an abandoned land quickly develops secondary vegetation, an over shooting occurs; as the forest cover recovers faster, the forest value drops off to a level even lower than that which preceded the initial deforestation, which makes landowners decide to deforest their land again. Because of this mechanism, the forested landscapes are likely to be unstable when the forest recovery rate (ji) is relatively large (Fig. 4) . This point is clearly illustrated in Fig. 3b where the boundary that separates the stable and unstable regions is drawn from the stability analysis in the Appendix. The unstable forested landscape is predicted in the region where the forest recovery rate is large (Fig. 3b) . This instability occurs when a society is categorized as a forested landscape; the landscapes where abandoned or agricultural land predominates are always stable. In addition, if the forest value is independent of the extent of forest cover (i.e., a = 0), instability never happens.
From these results, we conclude that the forest scarcity hypothesis would induce the forest transition when a landowner employs a low rate of future discounting. After the forest transition, a stable forested landscape is predicted if forests regenerate slowly, otherwise a cycle of deforestation and forest recovery characterizes the landscape.
The ecosystem service hypothesis
Classification of three landscape patterns. -When the forest value decreases with forest scarcity (i.e., the ecosystem service hypothesis), there exists a single or three equilibria (see Eqs. 3a, 3b, 9, and 10) . In the following, we outline three types of equilibrium landscapes (see the Appendix for stability analysis).
1. A stable deforested landscape. -If the discount factor (co) is small, there is a single equilibrium with low extent of forest cover, which is always stable ( Fig.  6b; a white region in Fig. 6a) . When the basic rate of forest recovery is smaller than that of the abandonment rate (ji < r|), this equilibrium is categorized as the abandoned landscape as illustrated in the section of forest scarcity hypothesis (Fig. 2b) , otherwise it is replaced by the agricultural landscape (Fig. 2c) . The net expected gain of deforestation is positive regardless of the initial extent of forest cover [i.e., AK(jc) > 0 for all x\. Hence the forest cover only declines to a minimum level that is close to 0.
2. A stable forested landscape. -If co is large enough and forest regeneration is not so rapid, there is a single equilibrium where almost entire landscape is covered with forest, which is always stable ( Fig. 6d ; a black region in Fig. 6a) . The net expected gain from deforestation is negative, and is unaffected by the initial extent of forest cover [i.e., AV(x) < 0 for all x]. Under this condition forest cover increases to a maximum level that is close to 1 .
3. A bistability of forested and deforested landscapes. -If co is intermediate or if forests regenerate rapidly, there are three equilibria of low (jc*), intermediate (jc*), and high extent of forest cover (jc* ) ( Fig. 6c ; a gray region in Fig. 6a) . Although jc* is always unstable, as a saddle point with a real eigenvalue of greater than 1 , jc* and jc* are always stable, indicating the bistable dynamics where both forested and deforested (including abandoned or agricultural) landscapes are likely to emerge depending on the initial extent of forest cover. The net expected gain of deforestation is positive if the initial extent of forest cover is less than the intermediate equilibrium (x < jc*), otherwise it is negative. Hence if the initial forest cover is less than jc*, the rate of deforestation accelerates and the forest cover further declines, converging to the abandoned or agricultural landscape. On the contrary, if the initial forest cover is larger than jc*, the rate of deforestation slows down, leading to a forested landscape after a gradual recovery of forests.
In all types of equilibrium landscapes, the combination of the two stages, deforestation and forest restoration, that characterize the forest transition is not likely to emerge from our simple landscape dynamics under the ecosystem service hypothesis. However, the finding of bistable dynamics provides an alternative way to look at the forest transition that we outline next.
The potential for catastrophic shifts from forested to deforested landscapes. -There is an alternative way to see the forest transition. The initial decline in forest cover is attributed to an external perturbation caused by rapid socioeconomic change (e.g., immigration, a rapid increase of food demand due to population growth, increasing consumer demands during industrialization or a collapse of civil authority) rather than bottom-up dynamics build around individual decision making in a closed system. The bistable dynamics imply that a small difference in the extent of such a perturbation (i.e., a size of deforestation) could lead to completely different consequences. For example, the forested landscape is robust when the size of remaining forest after forest loss is larger than jc* (e.g., forest loss less than 50%; Fig. 7a) . A society recovers its forest to the pre-perturbed level due to regrowth of secondary vegetation at abandoned lands because landowners anticipate larger return from forest restoration than further deforestation [i.e., AV(x) < 0 for x > jc*]. However, it is fragile when the size of remaining forests falls to below the critical level jc*; if the size of the deforested area exceeds 1 -jc* (e.g., forest loss more than 50%; Fig. 7b) , the expected forest value declines to a level even lower than the expected agricultural profit, which suddenly reverses the land-'owners' motivation from forest restoration to forest exploitation, resulting in a "catastrophic shift" from the forested to deforested landscape.
The likelihood of the catastrophic shift decreases as the discount factor (co) increases (Fig. 8a) . In a bistability region, the larger co becomes, the more the forested landscape becomes robust to a certain amount of forest loss. However, even if co is large enough, the catastrophic shift can occur, and the likelihood of this shift increases as the forest recovery rate increases (Fig.  8b) ; The larger p. becomes, the smaller size of forest loss could cause a catastrophic shift. This relation is observed because, as a general finding of the model, a large co reduces but a large p. enhances the rate of deforestation (e.g., see Satake et al. 20076 ).
In sum, landscape dynamics under the ecosystem service hypothesis are determined by the combination of the discount factor (co), the forest recovery rate (ji and /*), and the initial extent of forest cover. Forest restoration after a certain amount of forest loss is likely to occur when landowners employ a low rate of future discounting (i.e., large co), and forests regenerate slowly (i.e., small (i and h; Fig. 8 ). As the rate of future discounting or the forest recovery rate increases, an irreversible change from forested to deforested landscape should happen.
Discussion
This paper theoretically explored the potential of two feedback mechanisms between the forest loss and forest value (i.e., the forest scarcity and ecosystem service hypotheses) for explaining the recent historical transition from deforestation to forest restoration in many societies. For both hypotheses, we identified two factors, the rate of future discounting and the rate of forest regrowth, that play important roles in determining the likelihood of a forest transition and shaping subsequent landscape dynamics.
Rates of future discounting and forest transitions
We have two main findings about how the rate of future discounting influences the likelihood of forest transition, which is common to both hypotheses (see Figs. 2a and 6b): (1) if landowners heavily discount future utilities, the rate of deforestation accelerates, leading to repeated deforestation of forested parcels. Under these circumstances the transition from deforestation to forest restoration never happens. (2) If landowners employ a low rate of future discounting, their incentives for forest restoration are large because they anticipate that a long-run return from forest restoration is larger than a short-term gain from deforestation. Then landowners decide to protect regenerating forests, which spurs a transition from shrinking to expanding forests and eventually generates a forested landscape (Figs. 2d and 7a) . From these findings, we conclude that incentives for forest conservation seem stronger in settings where forests regenerate slowly as well as when decision makers value the future. To emphasize the role of slow forest regeneration in enhancing forest conservation, we consider what happens when forests regenerate fast. In so doing, we also demonstrate the fundamental difference between the outcomes from the forest scarcity and ecosystem service hypotheses. The results from the model analyses showed that even if landowners employ a low rate of future discounting (i.e., a large discount factor), the rapid regrowth of forests elevates the expected return from deforestation (see Eq. 9), which encourages the recurrence of large-scale deforestation. The rising economic value of forest attributable to forest losses (i.e., the forest scarcity hypothesis) works to suppress further deforestation, resulting in an increase of forest cover at first, but deforestation happens again after forest cover fully recovers, so a cycle of deforestation and forest recovery characterizes the landscape (Figs. 4 and 5) .
The opposite relation between forest loss and forest value, a decline of forest value due to environmental degradation (i.e., ecosystem service hypothesis), enforces deforestation pressure when a deforested area exceeds a critical size, and eventually causes an irreversible change from forested to abandoned landscape ( Fig. 7b; We acknowledge that our model is too simplified for a comprehensive understanding of the forest transition. We considered no explicit demographic, political and economic dynamics at macro level (e.g., population pressure and migration, trade policies, labor-market pressures, and technological changes). First, policies play an important role in determining deforestation rates (Vajpeyi 2001) . In order to incorporate the political dynamics that might result in government led attempts to restore forests and their ecosystem services, we need to couple the bottom-up approach developed here and the top-down approach in which a central government makes plans and policies for forest management, and resolves conflicts between stakeholders. For example, governmental investment for tree planting will enhance the rate of forest regrowth, which may contribute to reverse the trend from forest decline to expansion, and may finally lead to a forest-rich society. This type of control is likely to succeed in societies where centralized governments strongly control the behavior of individuals (Satake 2007 Second, economic development may be modeled by changing the model parameters. For example, as societies grow economically, off-farm economic opportunities improve, which may decrease agricultural utility (i.e., c in Eq. 4) and increase the rate of agricultural abandonment (i.e., r|; called "labor scarcity hypothesis"; Rudel et al. 2005 ). In addition, the impact of economic growth on the behaviors of individual landowners could depend upon spatial interactions and information exchanges between landowners, and upon heterogeneity among landowners' preferences.
Having created a minimum model that incorporates a few essential factors, future work might consider how the inclusion of additional factors, like those enumerated above, would alter the model's predictions.
